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Abstract
This paper sets out to resolve how agents ought to act in the Sleeping Beauty problem and various related
anthropic (self-locating belief) problems, not through the calculation of anthropic probabilities, but through
finding the correct decision to make. It creates an anthropic decision theory (ADT) that decides these
problems from a small set of principles. By doing so, it demonstrates that the attitude of agents with
regards to each other (selfish or altruistic) changes the decisions they reach, and that it is very important to
take this into account. To illustrate ADT, it is then applied to two major anthropic problems and paradoxes,
the Presumptuous Philosopher and Doomsday problems, thus resolving some issues about the probability
of human extinction.
1 INTRODUCTION
We cannot have been born on a planet unable to sup-
port life. This self-evident fact is an example of an-
thropic or self-locating reasoning: we cannot be ‘out-
side observers’ when looking at facts that are connected
with our own existence. By realising that we exist,
we change our credence of certain things being true or
false. But how exactly? Anyone alive is certain to have
parents, but what is the probability of siblings?
Different approaches have been used to formalise
the impact of anthropics on probability. The two most
popular revolve around the ‘Self-Sampling Assump-
tion’ and the ‘Self-Indication Assumption’ (Bostrom,
2002). Both of these give a way of computing anthropic
probabilities, answering questions such as ‘Given that
I exist and am human, what probability should I assign
to there being billions (or trillions) of other humans?’
The two assumptions are incompatible with each
other, and give different answers to standard anthropic
problems. Nor are they enough to translate probabil-
ities into decisions. Many anthropic problems revolve
around identical copies, deciding in the same way as
each other, but causal (Lewis, 1981) and evidential1
(Gibbard and Harper, 1981) decision theory differ on
whether agents can make use of this fact. And agents
using SIA and SSA can end up always making the same
decision, while still calculating different probabilities
(Armstrong, 2012). We are at risk of getting stuck in
an intense debate whose solution is still not enough to
tell us how to decide.
Hence this paper will sidestep the issue, and will not
advocate for one or the other of the anthropic proba-
bilities, indeed arguing that anthropic situations are a
distinct setup, where many of the arguments in favour
of probability assignment (such as long run frequen-
cies) must fail.
Instead it seeks to directly find the correct decision
in anthropic problems. The approach has some prece-
dence: Briggs argues (Briggs, 2010) that SIA-type deci-
sion making is correct. On the face of it, this still seems
an extraordinary ambition – how can the right deci-
sion be made, if the probabilities aren’t fully known?
It turns out that with a few broad principles, it is pos-
sible to decide these problems without using any con-
tentious assumptions about what the agent’s credences
should be. The aim of this approach is to extend classi-
cal decision making (expected utility maximisation) to
anthropic situations, without needing to use anthropic
probabilities.
This will be illustrated by careful analysis of one
of the most famous anthropic problems, the Sleeping
Beauty problem (Elga, 2000). One of the difficulties
with the problem is that it is often underspecified from
the decision perspective. The correct decision differs
depending on how much Sleeping Beauty considers the
welfare of her other copies, and whether they share
common goals. Once the decision problem is fully spec-
ified, a few principles are enough to decide the differ-
ent variants of the Sleeping Beauty problem and many
other anthropic problems.
That principled approach fails for problems with
non-identical agents, so this paper then presents an
Anthropic Decision Theory (ADT), which generalises
naturally and minimally from the identical agent case.
It is not a normative claim that ADT is the ideal
decision theory, but a practical claim that following
ADT allows certain gains (and extends the solutions
to the Sleeping Beauty problem). ADT is based on
‘self-confirming linkings’: beliefs that agents may have
∗Email: stuart.armstrong@philosophy.ox.ac.uk; Corresponding author
1 Evidential decision theory (EDT) has been argued to be undefined; see arguments in http://lesswrong.com/lw/e7e/whats_
wrong_with_evidential_decision_theory/ and Egan’s contention that ‘fixing’ causal decision theory must also ‘fix’ EDT (Egan,
2007), along with Joyce’s ‘fixing’ of causal decision theory (Joyce, 2012). Anthropic decision theory resembled EDT more than it
does CDT, but has distinct foundations.
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about the relationship between their decision and that
of the other agents. These linkings are self-confirming,
because if believed, they are true. This allows the con-
struction of ADT based on open promises to implement
self-confirming linkings in certain situations. Note that
ADT is nothing but the Anthropic version of the far
more general “Updateless Decision Theory2 and Func-
tional Decision Theory (Soares and Fallenstein, 2017).
The last part of the paper applies ADT to two fa-
mous anthropic problems: the Presumptuous Philoso-
pher and Doomsday problems, and removes their
counter-intuitive components. This is especially rel-
evant, as it removes the extra risk inherent in the
Doomsday argument, showing that there is no reason
to fear extinction more than what objective probabili-
ties imply (Bostrom, 2013).
2 SLEEPING BEAUTY PROBLEM
The Sleeping Beauty (Elga, 2000) problem is one of
the most fundamental in anthropic probability. Many
other problems are related to it, such as the absent-
minded driver (Aumann et al., 1996), the Sailor’s Child
Problem (M., 2006), the incubator and the presumptu-
ous philosopher (Bostrom, 2002). In this paper’s per-
spective, all these problems are variants of each other
– the difference being the agent’s level of mutual altru-
ism.
In the standard setup, Sleeping Beauty is put to
sleep on Sunday, and awoken again Monday morning,
without being told what day it is. She is put to sleep
again at the end of the day. A fair coin was tossed be-
fore the experiment began. If that coin showed heads,
she is never reawakened. If the coin showed tails, she
is fed a one-day amnesia potion (so that she does not
remember being awake on Monday) and is reawakened
on Tuesday, again without being told what day it is.
At the end of Tuesday, she is left to sleep for ever (see
Figure 1).
The incubator variant of the problem (Bostrom,
2002) has no initial Sleeping Beauty, just one or two
copies of her created (in separate, identical rooms), de-
pending on the result of the coin flip (see Figure 2).
The question, traditionally, is what probability a
recently awoken/created Sleeping Beauty should give
to the outcome of the coin toss or the day of the
week/room she’s in.
2.1 Halfers: the Self-Sampling Assumption
The self-sampling assumption (SSA) relies on the in-
sight that Sleeping Beauty, before being put to sleep on
Sunday, expects that she will be awakened in future.
Thus her awakening grants her no extra information,
and she should continue to give the same credence to
the coin flip being heads as she did before, namely 1/2.
In the case where the coin is tails, there will be two
copies of Sleeping Beauty, one on Monday and one on
Tuesday, and she will not be able to tell, upon awak-
ening, which copy she is. By the principle of indiffer-
ence, she should therefore assume that both are equally
likely. This leads to:
Assumption 2.1 (Self-Sampling Assumption)
All other things being equal, an observer should use
the standard non-anthropic3 probabilities for any world
they could be in. For computing their position in any
(possible) world with multiple observers, they should
assume they are randomly selected from the set of all
actually existent observers in that world, within their
reference class.
There are some issues with the concept of ‘reference
class’ (Bostrom, 2002), but here it is enough to set the
reference class to be the set of all other Sleeping Beau-
ties woken up in the experiment. We will return to the
problems with reference classes in Section 4.4.6, where
a fruitful identification is made between the reference
class and the people Sleeping Beauty cares about.
The probability calculations are straightforward;
upon awakening, Sleeping Beauty will have the follow-
ing probabilities:
PSSA(Heads) = 1/2
PSSA(Tails) = 1/2
PSSA(Monday|Heads) = 1
PSSA(Tuesday|Heads) = 0
PSSA(Monday|Tails) = 1/2
PSSA(Tuesday|Tails) = 1/2.
She then deduces:
PSSA(Monday) = 3/4
PSSA(Tuesday) = 1/4.
SSA can be called the halfer position, 1/2 being the
probability it gives for Heads.
2.2 Thirders: the Self-Indication Assumption
There is another common way of doing anthropic
probability, using the self-indication assumption (SIA).
This derives from the insight that being woken up on
Monday after heads, being woken up on Monday af-
ter tails, and being woken up on Tuesday are all sub-
jectively indistinguishable events. In terms of parallel
universes (or many worlds quantum physics (Everett,
1957)), in which half of the universes see heads and
half see tails, then one third of all of Sleeping Beauty’s
“awakening experiences” would be in the heads uni-
verses, and two thirds in the tails universes. This is
formalised as:
Assumption 2.2 (Self-Indication Assumption)
All other things being equal, an observer should reason
as if they are randomly selected from the set of all
epistemically possible observers.
2 See for instance https://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Updateless_decision_theory
3 Non-anthropic means the probability of each world, as judged from an “outsider” who doesn’t exist within any world (or
doesn’t use the fact of their existence to update the probabilities).
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Figure 1: The Sleeping Beauty Problem.
Figure 2: Incubator variant of the Sleeping Beauty problem.
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The definition of SIA is different from that of
Bostrom (Bostrom, 2002); what we call SIA he called
combined SIA+SSA. We shall stick with the definition
above, however, as it is the most common one used
in discussions and conferences. Note that there is no
mention of reference classes, as SIA is the same for all
reference classes4.
The three following observer situations are
equiprobable (each has a non-anthropic probability of
1/2), and hence SIA gives them equal probabilities 1/3:
PSIA(Monday&Heads) = 1/3
PSIA(Monday&Tails) = 1/3
PSIA(Tuesday&Tails) = 1/3.
She then deduces:
PSIA(Monday) = 2/3
PSIA(Tuesday) = 1/3
PSIA(Heads) = 1/3
PSIA(Tails) = 2/3.
SIA can be called the thirder position, 1/3 being
the probability it gives for Heads.
3 ARE PROBABILITIES NECESSARY?
Much of the discussion around the thirder and halfer
positions revolves around reconciling contrary intu-
itions. Intuitively, it seems correct that the probability
of heads or tails, upon awakening, should be 1/2 (the
halfer position). It also seems correct that, upon learn-
ing that it is Monday, the probability of heads or tails
should be 1/2 (the thirder position). And, finally, it’s
intuitively correct that the update rule upon learning
that it is Monday makes these two intuitions incom-
patible.
Then the arguments revolve around rejecting one
of these three intuitions (including, in an ingenious ar-
gument, the standard Bayesian update rule (Halpern,
2004)). This paper argues against all such approaches,
by claiming that probability is the wrong tool to be
using in this area. This argument can be grounded by
analysing how the usual probability arguments break
down.
3.1 Long run frequencies
The easiest interpretation of probability is the frequen-
tist one: an event’s probability is the limit of the rel-
ative frequency of a large number of trials. But it
was realised that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, you
would get different answers depending on whether you
counted the number of times Sleeping Beauty was cor-
rect, or the number of trials in which she was correct5
(Briggs, 2010; Halpern, 2004). The first case would
imply the thirder position; the second, the halfer.
3.2 Bayesianism: whose beliefs?
Bayesian probability grounds probability in states of
knowledge or states of belief (de Finetti, 1974; Jaynes,
1986). However, this approach has the same problems
as frequentism. A well-calibrated Bayesian estimator
that assigns a probability of 1/2 to something, expects
to be incorrect half the time (Lichtenstein, 1982). But
does this means half the times they estimate, or in
half the trials? Similarly, the Bayesian estimator will
reach different answers depending on whether they first
assess the relative probability of universes before as-
sessing their own identity (the halfer position), or vice
versa (the thirder position). There are tricky problems
distinguishing between “I expect to see”, and “I ex-
pect someone exactly identical to me to see”, which
can make degrees of belief ambiguous.
3.3 Intuition, identity, and evolution
Our understanding of probability is connected with our
subjective sentiment of identity, the “subjective cre-
dence” that “we” will or won’t be surprised by a cer-
tain outcome. There is a vast and ancient literature on
the concept of identity. It is also clear that personal
identity serves a useful evolutionary function, allowing
us to successfully plan for the long term rather than
leap from a window, confident that someone else will
hit the ground6.
But evolution does not aid in forging intuitions in
situations that did not exist in our evolutionary his-
tory. Duplication, merging and amnesia are not stan-
dard evolutionary situations, so we should not expect
to have good intuitions on them. Maybe if they had
been, we would now have a better subjective grasp of
the meaning of questions such as “Who do I expect to
be, given that there are two of me, both thinking the
same thing and asking the same question?”
3.4 Dutch Books and Cox’s theorem
There are strong arguments that any formalisation of
uncertainty must be done in terms of probability, with
Cox’s theorem providing the theoretical justification
and various Dutch Book arguments giving strong prac-
tical reasons to do so (Cox, 1946; de Finetti, 1974).
Both styles of arguments are however compatible with
the assignment of different priors. Thus they do ac-
tually impose the use of probabilities per se, but re-
quire that any process akin to updating probabilities
4 As long as the reference class is large enough to contain all the possible states the observer could be in; in this case, the
reference class must contain both Monday and Tuesday awakenings and both heads and tails for Monday.
5 This is sometimes called the difference between total and average inaccuracy.
6 See some further thoughts at http://lesswrong.com/lw/k9u/the_useful_definition_of_i/ and http://lesswrong.com/lw/
grl/an_attempt_to_dissolve_subjective_expectation_and/
7 To realise this, it suffices to notice that Anthropic Decision Theory can be phrased with various different probability assign-
ments, and then updates them in the traditional way. This demonstrates both the compatibility with Bayesian updates, and the
fact that no probability assignment is fundamental.
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must follow standard Bayesian rules. As shall be seen,
though Anthropic Decision Theory doesn’t assign prob-
abilities per se, it does respect such update rules7.
Some authors (Briggs, 2010; Hitchcock, 2004) aim
to extend Dutch Book arguments to anthropic situ-
ations, arguing for SIA on those grounds. But that
argument makes implicit assumptions as to how much
each agent values other copies, meaning it fits within
some of the frameworks below, but not all of them.
In fact, the failure of Dutch Books to distinguish be-
tween SIA and SSA is one of the strongest arguments
that conventional probability is the wrong tool to use
in anthropic situations. It is not simply a question
of the betting odds coming apart from the subjective
probabilities; it is a situation where the strongest argu-
ments that compel the need for subjective probabilities
no longer apply.
4 DECIDING SLEEPING BEAUTY
4.1 How to decide?
If Sleeping Beauty needs to make a decision after be-
ing awakened, then her choice of SSA or SIA is not
enough to fix her action. She’d be pretty sure that
any copies of her would reach the same decision as her.
But can she take this into account? Causal decision
theory would tell her to ignore these other decisions
(since she is not causing them) and evidential decision
theory would say the opposite.
An evidential decision theorist using SSA generally
reaches the same decisions as a causal decision theorist
using SIA, so neither her anthropic probability theory
nor her decision theory can be independently deduced
from her actions. How much “responsibility” she bears
for a joint decision also affects this (Armstrong, 2012).
Anthropic decision theory thus cares only about de-
cisions. It makes use only of elements agreed upon by
all observers: the non-anthropic probabilities in the ex-
periment, Sleeping Beauty’s utility function, the fact
that the copies are identical, and the use of classical
decision theory in non-anthropic situations.
4.2 Identical copies, different preferences?
Copies of Sleeping Beauty are assumed to be identi-
cal. Common sense would imply that identical agents
have identical preferences. This need not be the case:
two nationalists could both believe “my country right
or wrong”, but have different preferences if they lived
in different places. If the pronoun “my” was replaced
by its referent, the two nationalists would no longer
be identical. But if their preferences are phrased in
pronoun form, identical agents can have distinct pref-
erences.
It is important to know whether copies of Sleep-
ing Beauty value each other’s wellbeings. The mem-
ory erasure (or the duplication) means that this is no
longer self-evident. It is not prima facie obvious that
the Monday copy would be willing to forgo a choco-
late so that her Tuesday copy could have three. It is
even less obvious in the incubator variant. Thus we
will distinguish four idealised cases.
The first is non-indexical Sleeping Beauty: an agent
dedicated to maximising a specific utility function, a
single obsessive cause. Her life, her pleasure, and that
of others, are completely secondary to what she wants
to achieve – be it increasing the number of paperclips,
enhancing shareholder value, or awaiting the Messiah.
The second is altruistic total utilitarian Sleeping
Beauty. She desires to maximise the wellbeing of all
agents, including herself. Her utility function is the
sum of the wellbeing of all existent agents.
The third is altruistic average utilitarian Sleep-
ing Beauty, who similarly counts the wellbeing of all
equally with her own, but averages over the number of
agents in the world8.
The above agents have the same preferences as their
copies, in both pronoun and referent form. Not so for
the selfish Sleeping Beauty, who doesn’t care about
any other version of herself. This includes spatially
distinct copies, or versions of herself after memory era-
sure. Though these Sleeping Beauties have identically
phrased preferences – “everything to me!” – they have
distinct preferences: they disagree over which states of
the world are better, with each copy wanting to pull
the gain in her direction. But selfishness is not actu-
ally clearly defined, with two versions of selfishness –
the “psychological approach” and the “physically self-
ish” – resulting in different decisions.
4.3 Principles of decision
We define three principles of decision, to allow the
Sleeping Beauties to reach decisions without anthropic
probabilities. They are presented in decreasing order
of intuitiveness; not all three principles are needed in
every situation.
4.3.1 Anthropic diachronic consistency
The first principle is diachronic consistency: consis-
tency over time. If an agent’s preferences change in
a predictable manner, then outsiders may be able to
exploit this, by selling them something now that they
will buy back for more later, or vice versa, and many
axiomatic systems seek to avoid losing resources for
no purpose in this way. See the independence axiom
in the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms of expected
utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Non-
independent agents show diachronic inconsistency: af-
ter partially resolving one of the lotteries, their prefer-
ences change. This principle has been useful in other
circumstances (even used to deduce the Born rule in
quantum mechanics (Wallace, 2010).
We will use consistency in a simple form:
Assumption 4.1 Anthropic diachronic consistency
(AC): An agent can commit themselves to a future deci-
8 Both altruistic Sleeping Beauties have copy-altruistic variants, where Sleeping Beauty only cares about the wellbeing of other
Sleeping Beauties.
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sion (unless her future copy doesn’t remember the com-
mitment, or has different preferences9).
There are many ways to motivate this principle. If
an agent would want their future self to take a par-
ticular decision, they could take measures to enforce
this: leaving money in escrow to be released only un-
der certain conditions, making a public commitment
to a certain course of action, or, more classically, tying
themselves to the mast so that they can’t swim to-
wards the sirens. If they have access to their own mo-
tivational structure or their decision algorithms, they
could rewire themselves directly. Or more simply, just
decide that they would prefer to be a consistent person,
and make the effort to become so.
Note that the principle isn’t magic: it doesn’t avoid
the effects of amnesia potions. Sleeping Beauty, on
Sunday, could commit her future Monday and Tues-
day selves to certain courses of action, but the Monday
copy couldn’t commit her Tuesday self, as she wouldn’t
remember that.
AC is the missing piece needed for the Dutch Book
arguments of (Briggs, 2010; Hitchcock, 2004), so that
the different agents taking the different bets really act
as if they were the same person. Even this is not
enough, as we shall see: we need to know how exactly
the different copies value each other.
4.3.2 Irrelevant outside details
In classical decision problems, how the problem came
about is considered irrelevant to the decision. This
principle extends that irrelevance to anthropic prob-
lems.
Assumption 4.2 Irrelevant outside details (IOD):
Assume two anthropic problems are identical, in that
they have identical agents facing identical choices lead-
ing to identical consequences (in terms of their utili-
ties) with identical probabilities. Then the agents will
make the same decisions in both problems.
This principle can be motivated by imagining that
Sleeping Beauty is fed an additional amnesia potion,
that causes her to forget her past before Monday (but
conserves her preferences, knowledge, decision theory,
etc...) Then one could approach her when she wakes
up offering – for a price – to restore her pre-experiment
memories10, just long enough to help her make her cur-
rent decision. Intuitively, if would seem that she should
not pay you for this privilege11. What extra informa-
tion could she gain that would affect her decision?
4.3.3 Irrelevant inside details
Apart from outside details, classical decision theory
also considers many inside details as irrelevant. Only
a few details are generally taken to be important: the
decisions the agents face, possible outcomes, probabil-
ities, and the utility that each agent has for each out-
come. For copies, there is an extra subtlety: from the
outside, it’s evident that some outcomes are impossi-
ble. The two copies of Sleeping Beauties must make
the same decision; there cannot be an outcome where
one accepts an offer and the other turns down an iden-
tical one12. We’ll call the decisions of the two agents
‘linked’ (see Section 5), and our last principle decrees
that when two setups have the same possible linked
outcomes, then the decisions of the agents must be the
same.
Assumption 4.3 Irrelevant inside details (IID): If
two situations have the same setup, the same possible
linked decisions and the same utility outcomes for each
agent in every possible linked decision, and all agents
are aware of these facts, then agents should make the
same decisions in both situations.
A causal decision theorist could object to this prin-
ciple: the linked decision concept seems to implicitly
lock in an evidential decision theory. But one could ar-
gue that this is the behaviour that any agents (includ-
ing causal decision agents) would want to prescribe to
others, including to future copies. Since this principle
is only needed for Sleeping Beauties that are selfish,
one could conceive of it as a deal: it would be advanta-
geous for all selfish agents to follow this principle, and
they would desire it to be universally implemented, if
possible. Some of issues will discussed more at length
in Section 5.
To see how all these principles apply, we will now
look at a specific decision problem.
4.4 The decision problem
In order to transform the Sleeping Beauty problem into
a decision problem, assume that every time she is awo-
ken, she is offered a coupon that pays out £1 if the
coin fell tails. She must then decide at what price she
is willing to buy that coupon; for the rest of the pa-
per, we will assume her utility is linear in money (non-
indexicals being allowed to invest their income directly
in their cause, with linear returns).
The decisions made by different types of agents are
labelled “SIA”-like or “SSA”-like, since some will be-
have as we would intuitively expect a thirder or halfer
agent to behave.
4.4.1 Non-indexical Sleeping Beauty (SIA-like)
A non-indexical Sleeping Beauty, before she is put to
sleep the first time, will reason:
9 Recall that identical selfish copies do not have the same preferences (even if they are the same agent at different moments),
so they are not covered by this principle.
10 In an alternate variant, you could offer to confirm whether or not there had been a past version of herself or not – or maybe
you’d tell her whether Sunday Sleeping Beauty had thought about AC or whether she had wanted to constrain her future copies.
11 The past version of Sleeping Beauty certainly wouldn’t want her future version to pay to remember her!
12 Both could choose to accept the gamble with a certain probability – but they would both name the same probability.
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“In the tails world, future copies of me
will be offered the same deal twice. Since
they cannot distinguish between them-
selves, they will accept (or reject) the same
deal twice. Any profit they make will be
dedicated to our common cause, so from my
perspective, profits (and losses) will be dou-
bled in the tails world. If my future copies’
decision algorithm told them to buy the
coupon for £x, there would be an expected
£1/2(2(−x+1)+1(−x+0)) = £(1−3/2x)
going towards our goal. Hence I would want
them to buy for x < £2/3, or refrained
from buying for x > £2/3.”
Then by AC, she would change her decision proce-
dure to ensure her future copies will follow this pre-
scribed behaviour, buying below £2/3 and refraining
above.
4.4.2 Non-indexical Sleeping Beauty without the initial
Beauty (SIA-like)
In some variants of the Sleeping Beauty problem (such
as the sailor’s child (Neal, 2006) and the incubator),
there is no initial Sleeping Beauty to make decisions
for her future copies. Thus AC is not enough to resolve
the decision problem. Then we need to invoke IOD. By
this principle, the incubator variant is unchanged if we
started with an initial Sleeping Beauty that was then
copied (or not) to create the beings in the experiment.
That initial Beauty would follow the same reasoning
as the Sunday Beauty in the standard variant. Hence
by AC, these copies would buy for x < £2/3, and re-
frain from buying for x > £2/3. IOD reduces the non-
indexical incubator Sleeping Beauty to the standard
non-indexical Sleeping Beauty.
4.4.3 Altruistic total utilitarian Sleeping Beauty (SIA-
like)
Non-indexical agents (who don’t care about anyone’s
wellbeing) can be distinguished from altruistic agents.
The non-indexical agent only cares about the monetary
aspect of a bet in as much as the money can be used
to further their preferred outcome; the altruist cares
about the monetary aspect of a bet in as much as the
money provides personal welfare to each winner.
However, an altruistic total utilitarian will have the
same preferences over the possible outcomes in a Sleep-
ing Beauty situation13: the impact of outcomes in the
tails world is doubled, as any gain/loss happens twice,
to two different agents (or two different agent-slices),
and the altruist adds up the effect of each gain/loss.
It is not hard to see that the altruistic total utilitarian
Sleeping Beauty will make the same decisions as the
non-indexical one.
4.4.4 Copy-altruistic total utilitarian Sleeping Beauty
(SIA-like)
The above argument does not require that Sleeping
Beauty be entirely altruistic, only that she be altruis-
tic towards all her copies. Thus she may have selfish
personal preferences (“I prefer to have this chocolate
bar, rather than letting Cinderella get it”), as long as
these are not towards her copies (“I’m indifferent as
to whether I or Sleeping Beauty II gets the chocolate
bar”). And then she will make the same decision in
this betting problem as if she was entirely altruistic.
4.4.5 Copy-altruistic average utilitarian Sleeping Beauty
(SSA-like)
In Section 3.1, we mentioned how different ways of
combining long run results (total correct versus aver-
age correct) led to SSA or SIA being considered correct.
Similarly, average and total utilitarians will behave dif-
ferently in the Sleeping Beauty problem.
Consider the reasoning of an initial, copy-altruistic
average utilitarian Sleeping Beauty that considers her
Monday and Tuesday copies as two different agents
(since they won’t remember each other):
“If the various Sleeping Beauties decide to
pay £x for the coupon, they will make −£x
in the heads world. In the tails world, they
will each make £(1 − x) each, so an aver-
age of £(1 − x). This creates an expected
utility of £1/2(−x+(1−x)) = £(1/2−x),
so I would want them to decide to buy the
coupon for any price less than £1/2, and
refrain from buying it at any price more
than £1/2.”
And hence by AC, this will be the behaviour the
agents will follow. Thus they would be behaving as
if they were following SSA odds, and putting equal
probability on the heads versus tails world. As above,
for the incubator variant, we can use IOD to get the
same behaviour (“average utilitarian between copies”
is more intuitive in the incubator variant).
4.4.6 Altruistic average utilitarians and reference classes
Standard SSA has a problem with reference classes.
For instance, the larger the reference class becomes,
the more the results of SSA in small situations become
similar to SIA, a puzzling effect as the bounds of the
reference class can seem somewhat arbitrary.
The same situation arises with an altruistic aver-
age utilitarian Sleeping Beauty (rather than a copy-
altruistic one). Assume there are Ω other individuals
in the population that Sleeping Beauty cares about.
Then if the copies accept the coupon, the averaged
gain in the tails world is 2(1−x)/(2 + Ω), since the to-
tal population is 2 + Ω. The average loss in the heads
world is −x/(1+Ω), since the total population is 1+Ω.
13 It has been pointed out that an entirely altruistic agent would also care about the profit of whomever it was that offered
her the bet! Hence we’ll postulate that the bet is offered by a non-conscious machine, and that its value is ultimately created or
destroyed (rather than being given to, or taken from, someone).
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If Ω happens to be zero (because the agents are
copy-altruistic, or because there is nobody else in the
universe), then the situation proceeds as above, with
the indifference price of the coupon being £1/2. How-
ever, as Ω increases, the indifference price of the coupon
rises. If Ω is very large, then 2(1−x)/(2+Ω)−x/(1+Ω)
is approximately (2−3x)/Ω. Thus the agent’s indiffer-
ence price will be just below £(2/3) – the same as in
the total utilitarian case, a behaviour that looks “SIA-
ish”.
Hence one of the paradoxes of SSA (that changing
the reference class changes the agent’s probabilities),
is, in this context, closely analogous to one of the diffi-
culties with average utilitarianism: that changing the
population one cares about changes one’s decisions.
4.4.7 Selfish Sleeping Beauty (SIA or SSA-like)
In all above examples, the goals of one Sleeping Beauty
were always in accordance with the goals of her copies.
But what happens when this fails? When the different
versions are entirely selfish towards each other? Easy
to understand in the incubator variant (the different
created copies may feel no mutual loyalty), it can also
happen in the standard Sleeping Beauty problem if she
simply doesn’t value a time slice of herself that she
doesn’t remember (or that doesn’t remember her).
And here we hit the problem of defining selfishness.
It is actually considerably more subtle to define self-
ishness than altruism14. This is because even a selfish
agent is assumed to value a sufficiently close future
version of herself – if not, the agent cannot be said to
reach decisions, or even to be an agent. But different
ways of drawing the line result in different preferences.
One definition is the brute-physical view: that physical
continuity defines identity (Olson, 1997). Another def-
inition emphasises psychological continuity (Johnston,
1992). One can deduce preferences from these defi-
nitions15: physical continuity would imply that agent
doesn’t value the other copy of themselves in the tails
world, nor do they value a heads world in which they
didn’t exist. The psychological approach would simi-
larly fail to value the other copy in the tails world, but
would value the – psychologically identical – version of
themselves in the heads world.
The distinction can be made clearer referring to the
copies as “Sleeping Beauty” (SB) and “Snow White”
(SW), otherwise identical agents with distinct labels.
The physically selfish SB values only SB, and makes a
distinction between “I exist, with no copies” and “An
identical copy of me exists, but I don’t16”. In con-
trast, the psychologically selfish SB values only SB in
the tails world, but values whichever agent exists in the
heads world17.
Thus we consider three worlds, with different ex-
pected rewards in each, given that the agents pay £X
for the coupon (the rewards are expressed for SB; those
for SW are symmetric). See the outcomes in Table 1.
The non-anthropic probabilities of these three
worlds are 1/4, 1/4, and 1/2, respectively. Notice
first that psychological selfishness results in exactly the
same utilities as the average utilitarian. Invoking IID
means that they will give the same SSA-style decision.
The expected utility of the physically selfish agent,
however, is half of that of the total utilitarian agent
(and the non-indexical agent). Since utility can be
rescaled, IID can then be invoked to show that they
will make the same SIA-style decision. Note that the
factor of two is relevant in cases where agents have
preferences that are a mix of these “pure” preferences;
the total utilitarian pulls towards the thirder position
more than the physically selfish agent does.
4.5 Summary of results
We have five categories of agents18, and they follow
two different types of decisions (SIA-like and SSA-like).
In the Sleeping Beauty problem (and in more general
problems), the categories decompose:
1. Non-indexical agents who will follow SIA-like
odds.
2. (Copy-)Altruistic total utilitarians who will fol-
low SIA-like odds.
3. (Copy-)Altruistic average utilitarians who will
follow SSA-like odds.
4. “Psychologically” selfish agents who will follow
SSA-like odds.
5. “Physically” selfish agents who will follow SIA-
like odds.
For the standard Sleeping Beauty problem, the first
three results are derived from anthropic diachronic con-
sistency. The same result can be established for the
incubator variants using irrelevant outside details prin-
ciple. The selfish results, however, need to make use of
the irrelevant inside details principle.
14 In the author’s view, the confusion illustrated by this section shows that selfishness is not a stable concept: those agents
capable of changing their definitions of selfishness will be motivated to do so.
15 In the author’s view, the deduction should run the other way: from preferences, one can infer a useful concept of identity, that
can be different for different agents with different preferences.
16 This view is counterfactually relevant in the tails world; there is also an issue of a “Rawlesian veil of ignorance” (Rawls, 1971)
in the heads wold, but it is unclear that such a veil can be extended to not knowing one’s own existence.
17 We now take these to be the definition of physical and psychological selfishness, deliberately avoiding the issues of personal
identity that gave rise to them.
18 We could extend to more exotic categories, such as Sleeping Anti-Beauty (http://lesswrong.com/lw/4e0/sleeping_
antibeauty_and_the_presumptuous/) where the two copies in the tails world have antagonistic motivations. Psychological self-
ish Sleeping Beauty can correctly be seen as a 50− 50 uncertainty between the altruistic total utilitarians Sleeping Beauty and the
Sleeping Anti-Beauty.
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World Total util. Average util. Phy. Selfish Psy. Selfish
Heads, SB exists −X −X −X −X
Heads, SW exists −X −X 0 −X
Tails (both exist) 2− 2X 1−X 1−X 1−X
Table 1: Sleeping Beauty and Snow White’s utility in depending on their preferences and the outcome
5 BEAUTIES VARY IN THE EYE OF
THE BEHOLDERS: ANTHROPIC DE-
CISION THEORY
The previous section has strong claims to being nor-
mative – the three principles can be defended (to
slightly different degrees) as being intuitive and nec-
essary. They did however require that each Beauty be
strictly identical to each other. Given this fact, the
Beauties would reach the same decision in the same
circumstances – and they would know this fact, and
know that they knew this fact, and so on, making this
fact common knowledge (Fagin et al., 1995).
In this situation, there are strong arguments for su-
perrationality (Hofstadter, 1983) – for using this com-
mon knowledge to reach common goal. But this breaks
down if the agents are not identical (or are not known
to be identical).
Superrationality is often used to argue that agents
in the famous prisoner’s dilemma (PD) should mutu-
ally cooperate. And, similarly, identical agents in PD
can cooperate using similar reasoning about common
knowledge – and anthropic agents can be seen as simi-
larly “cooperating” to buy the multiple coupons in the
tails world. But cooperation between non-symmetric
agents is tricky: they can disagree as to who should
get the majority of the gains from trade, making the
process into a negotiation rather than a simple deci-
sion19.
It is for this reason that this section is not norma-
tive: Anthropic Decision Theory needs to be associated
with a “fair” (or at least agreed-upon) method for di-
viding gains, before it is complete. Since such division
is not relevant to the Sleeping Beauty problem, we will
simply assume that there is a single way of doing this,
and elide the problem.
5.1 Cooperation among diversity
Some agents can cooperate with each other even if they
are distinct and non-interacting. Agents using causal
decision theory (Lewis, 1981) will not cooperate with
anyone in these types of situations, as the different
agent’s decisions are not causally connected. Similarly,
it would be foolish for any agent to cooperate with a
causal decision theorist, as they would not return the
“favour”. In contrast, two evidential decision makers
could cooperate with each other if they had the belief
that it was likely that they would be reaching the same
decision.
More generally, consider some mystical brand X
that compels the bearer to cooperate with any other
bearer of X. This allows two X-bearers to cooperate,
and hence reach the same decisions as two identical
Sleeping Beauties in the problem above.
This does not guarantee general cooperation: X-
bearers need not cooperate with bearers of an other-
wise identical brand Y. But the question is: if you were
in an anthropic situation, and had the opportunity to
take the brand X (and Y, and Z, and so on for all other
mystic group-cooperation-forcing brands), should you?
From a causal decision perspective, the answer is
clearly no. But if there were some common ancestor
to both you and the other agent(s), then they would
clearly want all agents to take every cooperation brand
they could get their hands on.
There are no mystical cooperation brands in reality;
but, assuming that people are capable of precommitting
themselves to certain courses of action20 (Parfit, 1984),
there are ways of reaching the same state of coopera-
tion.
5.2 Self-confirming linkings
When agents reach decisions, define a linking between
them as:
Definition 5.1 (Linking) A linking between the de-
cisions of two agents is a restriction on the possible
joint decisions that the two agents could reach.
For instance, the knowledge that both agents are
identical and will decide similarly, gives such a linking.
The claim that both agents will reach opposite deci-
sions is another such linking. But note what happens
for the first case, in both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
the Sleeping Beauty problem: if both agents believe
they will reach the same decision, they will act on this
and reach individual decisions... that will indeed be the
same21. Whereas if the agents believe they will reach
opposite decisions, they will act on this and reach indi-
vidual decisions... that will be identical to each other22.
Thus, if both agents believe the first linking, it will be
true; if they believe the second, it will be false.
19 The issue doesn’t arise for identical agents, because one cannot gain (in expectation) at the expense of the other if they pursue
identical strategies.
20 Or of programming automated decision making machines to do so.
21 Mutual cooperation for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
22 Mutual defection for the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
23 The self-confirming linking has some formal similarities to “self-committing” and “self-revealing” utterances in game theory
(Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009).
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So we define a general self-confirming linking23:
Definition 5.2 (Self-confirming linking) A self-
confirming linking between two agents is a linking such
that if both agents believe it, they will reach decisions
that make the linking true.
Thus, choosing to accept a self-confirming linking
as a fact about the world, plays a similar role to accept-
ing the mystical brand X: it allows cooperation between
agents that do so. And since it is self-confirming, it is
actually true. Note that causal decision theory can be
seen as accepting a self-confirming linking along the
lines of “the other agent will maximise their utility as
if we reached decisions independently”.
5.3 Anthropic Decision Theory
With this definition, defining Anthropic Decision The-
ory is simple. An ADT agent is simply one that is
willing to search for self-confirming linkings24 and im-
plement them – accept them as a premise of reasoning:
Definition 5.3 (Anthropic decision theory (ADT))
An ADT agent is an agent that would implement a
self-confirming linking with any agent that would do
the same. It would then maximises its expected util-
ity, conditional on that linking, and using the standard
non-anthropic probabilities of the various worlds.
It’s not hard to see that if the Sleeping Beauties
in the previous chapter were all ADT agents, they
would all reach the “correct” decisions computed there.
Hence ADT is an extension to non-identical agents of
the decision-centric approach of the previous section.
As an illustration of this extension, consider the
non-indexical sleeping Beauty problem, but where each
agent has an independent 50% chance of valuing a
coupon at 5 pence more than its face value – maybe the
colour is attractive (since the agents are non-indexical,
rather than total utilitarian, they derive no utility from
having the other agent appreciate the coupon).
Then the following linking is always self-confirming:
If the two agents are offered a coupon priced below
£2/3, or above £(2/3 + 5/100), then they will make
the same decision.
Thus non-identical agents can ‘cooperate’ to ‘solve’
anthropic problems25, ‘defecting’ only on the range
£2/3 to £(2/3 + 5/100) (where neither agent will buy
the coupon). Note that on that range, the agents will
have the same behaviour, but this will only be true if
they don’t assume this fact when making their deci-
sion: the linking “Both agents will output the same
decision” is not self-confirming on that range.
The obvious generalisation of this is to situations
where the linking is likely but not certain. But there
are subtleties there, connected with the negotiation
problem; this is beyond the scope of this paper26.
5.3.1 Infinite ethics
SIA and SSA break down when there are infinite num-
bers of observers – indeed SIA fails when the expected
number of observers is infinite27.
ADT, on the other hand, does not intrinsically have
problems with infinite numbers of observers. If the
agents’ utilities are bounded, or if there are a finite
number of options, then ADT functions exactly as in
the finite agent cases. Thus ADT can apply to some
situations where SIA and SSA both break down.
6 APPLYING ANTHROPIC DECISION
THEORY
This section applies anthropic decision theory to two
major problems in anthropic probability: the Presump-
tuous Philosopher and the Doomsday argument. A
later paper will look into other anthropic problems,
such as the UN++ and the Adam and Eve problem
(Bostrom, 2001).
6.1 Presumptuous Philosopher
The Presumptuous Philosopher was introduced by
Nick Bostrom (Bostrom, 2002) to point out the ab-
surdities in SIA. In the setup, the universe either has
a trillion observers, or a trillion trillion trillion ob-
servers, and physics is indifferent as to which one is
correct. Some physicists are about to do an experi-
ment to determine the correct universe, until a pre-
sumptuous philosopher runs up to them, claiming that
his SIA probability makes the larger one nearly cer-
tainly the correct one. In fact, he will accept bets at
a trillion trillion to one odds that he is in the larger
universe, repeatedly defying even strong experimental
evidence with his huge SIA probability correction.
Note that the argument doesn’t work if there is
only one presumptuous philosopher in either universe.
For then, the number of other observers doesn’t mat-
ter: the philosopher will find each universe equiprob-
able (he’s a trillion trillion times more likely to exist
in the larger universe, but a trillion trillion times less
likely to be the presumptuous philosopher; these effects
exactly cancel). So the expected number of presump-
tuous philosophers in the larger universe needs to be
24 There could be multiple self-confirming linkings possible – for instance, causal decision theory has one. It’s clear that in many
situations, there are self-confirming linkings that are strictly better, for all agents, than the causal decision theory one. However,
there might not be a Pareto-dominant option that all agents could agree on: this brings us back to the issue of negotiations, which
we’re currently eliding.
25 One would like to extend this result to coupons priced between £2/3 and £(2/3 + 5/100).
26 To give a flavour of the difficulties: the linking previously described is self-confirming, while the linking “both agents output
the same decision” is self-confirming with a certain probability. Depending on whether or not they have the “+£5/100” valuation,
different agents will prefer one or the other of the two linkings, or certain intermediate ones. And are the agents supposed to decide
before or after realising their extra valuation?
27 http://lesswrong.com/lw/fg7/sia_fears_expected_infinity/
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a trillion trillion times larger than in the smaller uni-
verse. Let’s take the simplest case: there is one pre-
sumptuous philosopher in the smaller universe, and a
trillion trillion of them in the larger.
What does ADT have to say about this problem?
Implicitly, the philosopher is often understood to be
selfish towards all, including towards any copies of
himself (similarly, Sleeping Beauty is often implicitly
assumed to be non-indexical or copy-total altruistic,
which may explain the diverging intuitions on the two
problems) – or, at least, the issue of altruism is not
seen as relevant.
If the philosopher is selfish, ADT reduces to SSA-
type behaviour: the philosopher will correctly deduce
that in the larger universe, the other trillion trillion
philosophers or so will have their decision linked with
his. However, he doesn’t care about them: any benefits
that accrue to them are not of his concern, and so if he
correctly guesses that he resides in the larger universe,
he will accrue a single benefit. Hence there will be no
paradox: he will bet at 1:1 odds of residing in either
universe.
If the philosopher is an altruistic total utilitarian,
on the other hand, he will accept bets at odds of a
trillion trillion to one of residing in the larger universe.
But this no longer counter-intuitive (or at least, no
more counter-intuitive than maximising expected util-
ity for large utilities and very small probabilities): the
other presumptuous philosophers will make the same
bet, so in the larger universe, total profits and losses
will be multiplied by a trillion trillion. And since the
philosopher is altruistic, the impact on his own utility
is multiplied by a trillion trillion in the large universe,
making his bets rational.
It might be fair to ask what would happen if some
of the philosophers were altruistic while others were
selfish. How would the two interact; would the altru-
istic philosopher incorrectly believe his own decision
was somehow ‘benefiting’ the selfish ones? Not at all.
The decisions of the altruistic and selfish philosophers
are not linked: they both use ADT, but because they
have very different utilities, their linking is not self-
confirming: they would reach different decisions even
if they all believed in the linking.
6.2 Doomsday argument
The Doomsday argument (Carter and McCrea, 1983) is
an important and famous argument in anthropic rea-
soning. Based on SSA’s preference for ‘smaller’ uni-
verses, it implies that there is a high probability of the
human race becoming extinct within a few generations
– much higher than objective factors would imply. In
a very simplified form, the argument states that we are
much more likely to be one of a small group than one
of a large group, so it is much more likely that there
are fewer humans across time than many. Since we’re
pretty solid on the number of humans in the past, this
implies a smaller future: hence a doomsday for our
species at some point soon.
Under SIA, the argument goes away (Dieks, 2007),
so it seems that ADT must behave oddly: selfish
and altruistic agents would give different probabilities
about the extinction of the human race! But recall that
it is decisions that ADT cares about, not probabilities
– so can we phrase a reasonable Doomsday decision?
SSA-like behaviour comes from psychologically self-
ish or average utilitarian agents. Focusing on the aver-
age utilitarians, assume that there is an event X with
probability p which will ensure humanity’s survival. If
that happens, then there will be a total of Ω humans;
otherwise, the human population will cap at ω < Ω.
Assume there is another event Y which is indepen-
dent of X, but also has a probability of p. The agent
must choose between a coupon that pays out £1 on X,
and one that pays out £1 on Y .
The expected utility of the X coupon is simply
p/Ω, since Ω will be the population if X happens.
The expected utility of the Y coupon is a bit more
complicated, since with probability p, its expected
value is p/Ω, and with probability (1 − p), it is p/ω.
Putting all these together gives an expected value of
p[p/Ω + (1− p)/ω]. That quantity is greater than p/Ω,
thus the agent will choose the coupon paying on Y .
This reproduces the original Doomsday Argument:
two events of equal probability, X and Y , and yet, be-
cause X is connected with human survival while Y is
independent of it, the agent chooses the coupon paying
on Y . And the larger the population gets – Ω relative
to ω – the more pronounced this effect becomes. This
looks like a fear of doom (and would be, if a total util-
itarian made the same decision), but is clearly just a
quirk of the average utilitarian’s preference system.
7 CONCLUSION
Anthropic decision theory is a new way of dealing with
anthropic (self-locating belief) problems, focused ex-
clusively on finding the correct decision to make, rather
than the correct probabilities to assign. It deals suc-
cessfully with many classical anthropic puzzles, and
resolves various paradoxes such as the Presumptuous
Philosopher and the Doomsday argument, in ways that
don’t clash with intuition.
In many situations, ADT is moreover a consequence
of simple principles of Anthropic diachronic consis-
tency, Irrelevant outside details and Irrelevant inside
details. In order to apply it fully, some facts became
very important, such as whether the agents were al-
truistic or selfish, total or average utilitarians – facts
that are generally not relevant in most non-anthropic
problems. But when making a decision in anthropic
situations, they matter tremendously: the difference
between SIA-like and SSA-like behaviour is down to
how copies value each other’s goals.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper has been a long time in preparation, and I
want to gratefully acknowledge the help of many peo-
ple, too numerous to mention or even remember, from
11
the Future of Humanity Institute, the Machine Intelli-
gence Research Institute, philosophers working in an-
thropic probability, and the online community of Less
Wrong.
References
Stuart Armstrong. Anthropics: why probability isn’t
enough. Technical report, Future of Humanity Insti-
tute, University of Oxford, 2012.
Robert J. Aumann, Sergiu Hart, and Motty Perry.
Absent-minded driver. Proceedings of the 6th confer-
ence on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowl-
edge, 1996.
Nick Bostrom. The doomsday argument, adam & eve,
un++, and quantum joe. Synthese, 127(3), 2001.
Nick Bostrom. Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection
Effects in Science and Philosophy. Routledge: New
York, 2002.
Nick Bostrom. Existential risk prevention as global
priority. Global Policy, 4:15–31, 2013.
R. Briggs. Putting a value on beauty. Oxford Studies
in Epistemology, 3:3–34, 2010.
Brandon Carter and W. H. McCrea. The anthropic
principle and its implications for biological evolu-
tion. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal So-
ciety of London, 310(1512):347–363, 1983. doi:
10.1098/rsta.1983.0096.
R. Cox. Probability, frequency, and reasonable expec-
tation. American Journal of Physics, 14:1–10, 1946.
B. de Finetti. Theory of probability. J. Wiley & Sons,
1974.
Dennis Dieks. Reasoning about the future: Doom
and beauty. Synthese, 156(3):427–439, 2007. doi:
10.1007/s11229-006-9132-y.
A. Egan. Some counterexamples to causal decision the-
ory. Philosophical Review, 116:93–114, 2007.
A. Elga. Self-locating belief and the sleeping beauty
problem. Analysis, 60:143–147, 2000.
H. Everett. Relative state formulation of quantum me-
chanics. Reviews of Modern Physics, 29:454–462,
1957.
R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi.
Reasoning About Knowledge. MIT Press, 1995.
A. Gibbard and W. L. Harper. Counterfactuals and
two kinds of expected utility. Ifs: Conditionals, Be-
liefs, Decision, Chance, and Time, pages 153–190,
1981.
J. Y. Halpern. Sleeping beauty reconsidered: Condi-
tioning and reflection in asynchronous systems. In
Proceedings of the Twentieth Conference on Uncer-
tainty in AI, pages 226–234, 2004.
C. Hitchcock. Beauty and the bets. Synthese, 139:
405–420, 2004.
D. Hofstadter. Dilemmas for superrational thinkers,
leading up to a luring lottery. Scientific American,
248, 1983.
E. T. Jaynes. Bayesian methods: General back-
ground. In J. H. Justice, editor, Maximum-Entropy
and Bayesian Methods in Applied Statistics. Cam-
bridge University Press, 1986.
M. Johnston. Constitution is not identity. Mind, 101:
89–105, 1992.
J. M. Joyce. Regret and instability in causal decision
theory. Synthese, 187:1–23, 2012.
D. Lewis. Causal decision theory. Australasian Jour-
nal of Philosophy, 59(1):5–30, 1981. doi: 10.1080/
00048408112340011.
S. B. Lichtenstein. Calibration of probabilities: The
state of the art. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
R. M. Puzzles of anthropic reasoning resolved using
full non-indexical conditioning. 2006. Arxiv preprint
math/0608592.
R. M. Neal. Puzzles of anthropic reasoning resolved us-
ing full non-indexical conditioning. Arxiv preprint,
math/0608592, 2006.
E. T. Olson. The human animal: Personal identity
without psychology. Oxford University Press, 1997.
Derek Parfit. Reasons and Persons. Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1984.
John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: Belknap Press, 1971. ISBN 0-674-00078-
1.
Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems:
Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Founda-
tions. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Nate Soares and Benja Fallenstein. Cheating death
in damascus. Technical report, Machine Intelligence
Research Institute, 2017. https://intelligence.
org/files/DeathInDamascus.pdf.
John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern. Theory
of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ,
Princeton University Press, 1944.
D. Wallace. How to prove the born rule. In S. Saun-
ders, J. Barrett, A. Kent, and D. Wallace, editors,
Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, and Re-
ality. Oxford University Press, 2010.
12
